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TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT:  






The Truth In Negotiations Act (TINA) is a contracting statute that has been put into place 
in order to protect the Department of Defense’s funds by mandating that contractors 
provide certified cost or pricing data. When cost estimates exceed the TINA threshold 
($700,000), and when all other means of negotiating fair and reasonable pricing are not 
available, TINA ensures that a fair and reasonable price can be determined from the 
contractor submitted data. Despite its good intentions, TINA remains controversial. 
Supporters of TINA argue that certified cost or pricing data protects the government’s 
funding: if a later audit shows pricing deviations, the U.S. government can charge 
contractors penalties and recoup funds if necessary. Critics of TINA, however, argue that 
TINA does not provide the right incentives to contractors to induce their best efforts. In 
fact, with certain types of contracts on the contract type spectrum, the contractor and the 
government both may benefit if TINA provisions are modified to allow for flexibility 
with certified cost or pricing data. This study proposes to evaluate TINA from an 
economic view, with a contracting emphasis on investigating incentives that are 
generated under TINA. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND  
Prior to the 1960s, the government was not considered to be on an even footing 
with the government contactor when negotiating contract prices (Murdock, 2012, slide 5). 
Non-commercial item pricing was considered complete in good faith of the offerors and 
guidance regarding fair and reasonable pricing was left to the Contracting Officer’s 
judgment. When the Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA), Public Law 87–653 was passed, it 
seemed that the DOD would be heading in the right direction (Murdock, 2012, slide 5). 
Not only would cost or pricing data be required for noncommercial items, but also 
contractors found to be providing incomplete data would be liable for remedy. 
Additionally, the burden of proof would solely be the contractor’s responsibility should a 
defective pricing case be filed. It seemed that the ultimate goal had finally been attained: 
that Contracting Officers would be guaranteed access to cost or pricing data to negotiate 
fair and reasonable prices, and contractors would be putting forward their best effort to 
maintain those prices. 
Despite its good intention and more than a half-century in practice, TINA remains 
a controversial issue. Advocates of TINA would argue that TINA effectively reduces 
contractors’ incentives for engaging in “defective pricing” practices. Opponents, on the 
other hand, point to the extra cost burden and other unintended negative consequences. 
This lack of consensus indicates that a comprehensive assessment of TINA’s weaknesses 
and strengths is necessary. This study will evaluate TINA from an economic perspective, 
with emphasis on investigation of contractor incentives. To measure incentive 
effectiveness, contract benefits and costs will be analyzed in a series of contract 
scenarios. Based on these findings, recommendations will be made. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The main purpose of this research is to raise and address a major issue in the 
current policy of TINA. That is, concerning the potential litigation risk imposed by 
TINA, contractors lack incentives to exert their best effort. Such sub-optimal efforts 
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introduce inefficiencies that are ultimately borne by taxpayers for each contract as it 
pertains to profit and applicable costs to the government. In this economic analysis, the 
pros and cons will be assessed and an implementation of useful policies will be explained 
in a way forward for the use of TINA. This research is important because it identifies 
weaknesses of TINA and influence policy recommendations. Significant cost savings 
could be achieved by providing the right incentives to DOD contractors.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions of this thesis are: 
1. Does TINA provide the proper incentives (or disincentives) for DOD 
contractors to induce their best effort? 
2. How should TINA be used in a dynamic setting? 
3. What incentive-compatible policy implications can be generated from this 
scenario based analyses and economic research? 
D. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
The beneficiaries of this research include: the Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy (DPAP), the government contracting units, DOD contractors, and the 
United States taxpayers. This research seeks to provide better incentive solutions to 
induce contractors’ best effort while also generate cost savings to the government. In 
return, designing a better incentive system will foster stronger DOD-Contractor 
relationships, and hence form a more streamlined and efficient process. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
A thorough review, on relevant academic literature and institutional knowledge of 
TINA, is first provided to set the stage for further analysis. Then we employ an 
economic-based, incentive-centric study that focuses on investigation of various 
incentives generated by TINA. We perform analyses for various contracting settings. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Our research is organized into six chapters.  
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Chapter I details the background, the purpose, and research questions of this 
thesis. We also discuss beneficiaries; methodology and organization flow in this chapter. 
Chapter II provides a detailed description of TINA that includes its historical evolution, 
as well as the current implementation. This chapter also discusses exceptions to certified 
cost and pricing data. Chapter III reviews academic literature that is relevant to our 
research. This literature review discusses the issues with agency theory, moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems in the defense procurement system. The purpose of Chapter 
IV is to document TINA’s past success. We introduce compliance issues with TINA and 
provide data from the Defense Contract Audit Agency with TINA audits from 2008-
present. This chapter also discusses how the use of TINA reduces information rents. 
Chapter V describes how TINA fails to address the “Moral Hazard” problem with Fixed-
Price Contracts, Cost-Plus Contracts, and also incentive based contracts. It includes a 
numerical example with reasonable assumptions to show how correcting contractors’ 
misaligned incentives can generate the cost-savings to the government. This chapter also 
addresses some other unintended negative consequences that are attributable to TINA. 
The final chapter summarizes the research that was performed for this report and gives 
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II. TINA INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the obligations of a contracting officer is to negotiate fair and reasonable 
pricing on any service or product that he or she purchases on behalf of the Government. 
There are four approaches that a contracting officer can take in order to ensure that fair 
and reasonable pricing is met. The four fair and reasonable pricing approaches include 
adequate price comparisons, commercial prices, prices that have already been set by laws 
and/or regulations, and obtaining certified cost and pricing data (via TINA). (FAR 
15.403, 2014). Being able to obtain fair and reasonable pricing based on any of these four 
approaches allows the DOD to protect the taxpayer’s dollar and ensure that we are 
receiving a fair and reasonable price. TINA allows the contracting officer to negotiate fair 
and reasonable prices with the contractor when prices aren’t available by the other three 
approaches. Being able to obtain certified cost and pricing data is crucial to the success of 
the acquisition because it not only allows negotiations of fair and reasonable pricing, but 
it also provides a blanket of protection for the U.S. government as well. Another benefit 
of receiving certified cost and pricing data is that at the completion of the acquisition, the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency can audit the contractors’ actual prices and determine if 
defective pricing exists.  
The Truth In Negotiations Act (TINA) was created in 1962 to protect the U.S. 
government from overpaying the contractor due to the lack of supporting cost and pricing 
data (Williams, 1970, p. 3). When the cost of a product or service reaches over the 
current TINA dollar threshold and comparative pricing is not available, contractors are 
required, under TINA, to provide certified cost and pricing data (Williams, 1970, p. 4). 
This pricing data provides the government a basis to determine a fair and reasonable 
price. Without the TINA statute, certified cost and pricing data would not be available to 
the contracting officer, which could make it difficult for the contracting officer to 
determine whether costs are fair and reasonable.  
  6
To understand how TINA works, it is important to understand what certified cost 
and pricing data is and how contractors obtain this information. The Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR) defines certified cost and pricing data as  
Certified cost or pricing data” means “cost or pricing data” that were 
required to be submitted in accordance with FAR 15.403–4 and 15.403–5 
and have been certified, or are required to be certified, in accordance with 
15.406–2. This certification states that, to the best of the person’s 
knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data are accurate, complete, and 
current as of a date certain before contract award. Cost or pricing data are 
required to be certified in certain procurements (10 U.S.C. 2306a and 41 
U.S.C. chapter 35). (FAR 2.101, 2014) 
The use of TINA creates an accountability check for both the DOD as well as the 
contractors in order to prevent defective pricing. The remainder of this chapter will 
include a historical review of TINA, the enactment and policy implementation of TINA, 
and also exceptions to certified cost and pricing data. 
B. TINA DEFINED 
The Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) is a statute that has been put into place in 
order to protect the U.S. government from obtaining inflated pricing. TINA comes into 
effect when the government has a purchase for a product or service estimated to cost over 
the current TINA threshold and no other pricing information is available. When a 
contractor submits a proposal, they need to provide certified cost and pricing with their 
proposal, which protects the government from the contractor over-inflating their price 
and the government paying too much for a product or service. Since the Government has 
no other pricing information, it is difficult for the contracting officer to determine what 
price is reasonable for the product or service being procured. With TINA, the U.S. 
government is provided with certified cost and pricing data from the contractor, which 
provides a blanket of protection from the government overpaying for the procured 
product or service. What exactly does TINA do to protect the U.S. government?   
Prior to negotiations, the contractor submits cost and pricing data that has yet to 
be certified. Once negotiations have been completed, and both parties have agreed on 
price, this is when the contractor provides certified cost and pricing data for submitting to 
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the contracting officer. It isn’t until the procurement is completed or near completion that 
DCAA can perform an audit of the contractors’ certified cost and pricing data in 
comparison with their actual costs. Once the audit is complete, the government can 
recoup costs if DCAA identifies a defective pricing situation, due to defective cost and 
pricing data (Rene G. Rendon, personal communication, 10 November 2014). 
PGI 215.402(1) provides the Pricing Policy and provides the guidelines for 
the Truth in Negotiations Act.  
(1) Contracting officers must purchase supplies and services from 
responsible sources at fair and reasonable prices. The Truth in 
Negotiations Act (TINA) (10 U.S.C. 2306a and 41 U.S.C. chapter 35) 
requires offerors to submit certified cost or pricing data if a procurement 
exceeds the TINA threshold and none of the exceptions to certified cost or 
pricing data requirements applies. Under TINA, the contracting officer 
obtains accurate, complete, and current data from offerors to establish a 
fair and reasonable price (see FAR 15.403). TINA also allows for a price 
adjustment remedy if it is later found that a contractor did not provide 
accurate, complete, and current data. (PGI 215.402(1), 2014) 
Like the name states, the Truth In Negotiations Act “… significantly levels the 
playing field regarding superior knowledge regarding cost and pricing data…” (Public 
Contracting Institute, 2014, p. 1). Since the contracting officer is not expected to be the 
subject matter expert on the costs of the procured product or service, the contractor 
providing certified cost and pricing data to the contracting officer allows both the 
contracting officer and contractor to be on the same level in regards to knowing what a 
fair and reasonable price is for the procured item or service. Without the TINA statute in 
effect, the contractor could come into negotiations with all of the vital pricing 
information and induce the government to unknowingly enter into a contract at a highly 
unreasonable price.  
One of the main responsibilities of a contracting officer is to ensure that the 
taxpayer’s money is being utilized in the most effective way possible, and this is 
accomplished with the ability to obtain fair and reasonable pricing to ensure quality 
products and services at a reasonable price. TINA is put into effect in order to protect the 
taxpayers’ dollar. A fair and reasonable price doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s the lowest 
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negotiated price. If a contractor submits a proposal that is significantly below the 
competitor’s bid this should raise concern to the contracting officer. The low proposal 
could mean that a contractor is low-balling their proposal or that they don’t necessarily 
understand the full requirement. On the other hand, a proposal that is too high is cause for 
concern as well. “In determining fair and reasonable prices, the contracting officer is 
concerned with price realism (cost is too low) and price competitiveness (price is too 
high)” (Rene G. Rendon, personal communication, 01 December 2014). 
C. ENACTMENT AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION OF TINA 
Congress enacted TINA into law in 1962. The enactment came about due to the 
GAO findings in 1959 that the government was overpaying contractors for their products 
or services (2013 Contract Attorneys Desktop, pp.12–12, 12–13). “Between 1957 and 
1962 the GAO discovered overcharges amounting to $61 million1 resulting from the 
contractors’ failure to provide government negotiators with complete, accurate and 
current cost and pricing data2” (Williams, 1970, p. 1). There was a serious issue with the 
government overpaying and it needed to be resolved immediately. “The importance of 
this problem was reflected in prompt congressional hearings to thoroughly examine the 
problem3 and the revision by the Department of Defense (DOD) of its cost certification 
procedures” (Williams, 1970, p. 1–2).  
As a result, it was determined that certified cost and pricing data was needed to be 
made mandatory and enacted into law. When this law became enacted, it required 
certified cost and pricing data on all contracts that surpassed the amount of $100,000 (Di 
Guiseppe, 2011, p. 3). Years later, this threshold was increased to $650,000 first and then 
to the current amount of $700,000 (Maddox, 2013, p. 26).  
                                                 
1 Hearings on Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before the Subcomm. For Special 
Investigation of the House Comm. On Armed Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 6 (1963). 
2 Id. According to one knowledgeable official: The buyer’s lack of knowledge…of the latest cost data 
available to the vendor in establishing prices is the most important weakness observed in the vendor in 
establishing prices is the most important weakness observed in the cases (of overpricing). This has resulted 
in excessive prices being paid by the government. 
3 E.g., Hearings Before the Procurement Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 146 (1960). 
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D. EXCEPTIONS TO CERTIFIED COST AND PRICING DATA 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, there are four approaches the 
Government has to ensure a fair and reasonable price. The four fair and reasonable 
pricing approaches include adequate price competition, commercial prices, prices that 
have already been set by laws and/or regulations, and obtaining certified cost and pricing 
data (via TINA). (FAR 15.403, 2014, p. 1).   
Out of the four approaches, having adequate price competition is the best way to 
receive a fair and reasonable price. If this approach is not available next best would be to 
buy commercial. The third best approach is to obtain fair and reasonable pricing based on 
prices that are set by laws and regulations. When none of the three approaches to 
receiving fair and reasonable pricing are available, then TINA requires contractors to 
submit certified cost and pricing data to ensure prices that are fair and reasonable. TINA 
is not the most preferred method, but it does allow for the contracting officer to obtain 
fair and reasonable pricing in order to support public policy. (Rene G. Rendon, personal 
communication, 26 November 2014).  
Based on the above discussion, one of the approaches to negotiating fair and 
reasonable prices is to obtain certified cost and pricing data (TINA). (FAR 15.4, 2014, 
p.1). However, the FAR identifies exceptions to requiring certified cost and pricing data. 
These exceptions include: 
(1) When the contracting officer determines that prices agreed upon are 
based on adequate price competition (see standards in paragraph (c)(1) of 
this subsection); 
(2) When the contracting officer determines that prices agreed upon are 
based on prices set by law or regulation (see standards in paragraph (c)(2) 
of this subsection);  
(3) When a commercial item is being acquired (see standards in paragraph 
(c)(3) of this subsection); 
(4) When a waiver has been granted (see standards in paragraph (c)(4) of 
this subsection); or  
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(5) When modifying a contract or subcontract for commercial items (see 
standards in paragraph (c)(3) of this subsection). (FAR 15.403-1(b)(1)-(5), 
2014). 
Although a TINA waiver can be acquired, this is not the most suitable method due 
to the fact that even though TINA is not the most preferred method of receiving fair and 
reasonable pricing, it is the Contracting Officer’s last resort for ensuring fair and 
reasonable prices. (Rene G. Rendon, personal communication, 26 November 2014). 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview on the Truth In Negotiations Act, a definition, 
how it is implemented in the Department of Defense, as well as the exceptions to certified 
cost and pricing data. It outlined the purpose for this statute and why it is important to 
apply TINA accordingly, in order to ensure that the Government funding is protected and 
to help in preventing defective pricing against the government. TINA is an important 
statute that is adaptable to the changing times with modification made to the threshold 










III. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews academic literature that is relevant to DOD acquisition, and 
sets foundation for the subsequent analyses. Agency theory and the contract management 
process will be discussed as an overview for many of the topics included in this chapter. 
Delving more into the literature, a general description of the unique characteristics that 
underlie DOD major weapon system acquisitions will be introduced, and then this 
chapter will discuss adverse selection and moral hazard concepts. Further, elaboration on 
why DOD contracting is subject to both adverse selection and moral hazard problems, 
and consequently, limiting information rents and inducing the best effort naturally 
become the two objectives for the policy makers will be discussed. Also, this chapter will 
introduce the concept of “power of incentive schemes” and how this concept applies to 
various contract types. Finally, non-commitment and ratchet effect in DOD contracting is 
discussed, along with a brief introduction to the cost padding behavior of DOD 
contractors.    
B. AGENCY THEORY AND THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory reflects the relationship between the government (principal) and 
contractors (agency). This relationship is shown as a contract. As discussed by Dr. Rene 
G. Rendon,  
The principal (government) contracts with the agent (contractor) to 
perform a level of effort, such as developing or manufacturing a product 
or providing service. In this relationship, the government’s objectives 
include obtaining the product or service at the right quality, right quantity, 
right source, right time, and right price...Contractors, on the other hand, 
pursue the objectives of earning profit, insuring company growth, 
maintaining or increasing market share, and improving cash flow... 
(Rendon, 2011, p. 5) 
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In addition to conflicting objectives, there is information asymmetry between both 
parties. The contractor knows more about the capabilities and cost data while the 
government knows more about the mission and the requirement.  
The conflicting objectives and information asymmetry between the government 
and contractor result in both parties demonstrating specific behavior during the 
contracting process. The government seeks additional information on the contractor, for 
example, information related to contractor’s capability, cost and pricing data, and 
performance during the contract period. The contractor seeks to take advantage of its 
superior level of information by hiding information and perhaps hiding effort or lack of 
effort during the contract performance period. This behavior is reflected in the contract 
management process, which will be discussed next. 
Figure 1 describes the relationship between the government and the contractor as 
well as the principal-agent problem.      
 
Figure 1.  Agency Theory (from Rendon, 2011, p. 6)  
  13
The figure shows the conflicting goals between government and contractors. 
Agency theory describes this conflict as the government and contractor being 
asymmetric. As shown above in Figure 1, both parties withhold or share information due 
to the conflicting goals of their individual objectives. Their behavior for each objective 
depicts how the contract management process will be executed. The contract 
management process is designed to counter agency theory.  
2. Contract Management Process  
As stated, the contract management process is designed to mitigate the adverse 
effects of agency theory through acquisition policy and process. For acquisitions 
personnel, there are six key steps to follow when managing requirements and contracts 
(Rendon, 2011, p. 6). Each step is the governments counter to agency theory issues, 
which will be discussed throughout this chapter, as well as the entire contract 
management process.  
1. Procurement Planning: the process of knowing what, how, and when to 
procure. This step provides timely completion of market research and conducting 
requirement definition to gain knowledge and information from potential offerors. A 
request for information (RFI) is used quite often during this phase to combat any gray 
areas or lack of knowledge on a requirement. Requirements personnel will define the 
product or service and estimate costs of obtaining them. With the requirement 
information, a contract type may be chosen that falls on either the cost reimbursement 
spectrum or the fixed price spectrum (refer to Figure 2).  
2. Solicitation Planning: the process for preparing documents for a solicitation. 
Solicitation planning is where the type of contract vehicle that will be used is determined 
and where the government defines the terms and conditions of a contract which can allow 
cost and pricing information to be collected from potential offerors. The basis of the 
requirement will be provided to prospective bidders to offer proposals. 
3. Solicitation: the process of attaining proposals from perspective contractors.  
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4. Source Selection: the process of attaining proposals and applying the proposal 
to the evaluation criteria. Data on past performance and reviews of the proposals 
including negotiating a price is also completed within the source selection phase. Once 
the contract process reaches source selection and offeror data is negotiated, cost or 
pricing data must be certifiable in order to determine price fair and reasonableness prior 
to acceptance. Requiring certifiable data mitigates the risk of contractor-hidden 
information because throughout the life of the contract, certified data must be updated to 
avoid the legal consequences of TINA. In major defense acquisition systems, certifiable 
data and negotiated cost estimations are imperative to mitigating cost overruns. If the 
government does not receive all information or the contractor does not provide their best 
level of effort to mitigate cost overruns, then adverse selection and moral hazards may be 
present. 
5. Contract Administration: the process of maintaining, monitoring, and surveying 
the contract and ensuring all requirements are met. 
6. Contract Closeout: the process of verifying that the contract is complete and all 
requirements are met in accordance with the contractual agreement. This includes the 
audit of actual cost verses estimated cost, final acceptance of deliveries as well as final 
payment. Although each step in the acquisition process is needed to ensure successful 
contract execution, important steps pertaining to TINA include procurement planning, 
source selection, and contract closeout. Because major defense systems procurement is 
large and unique, the complexities associated with information asymmetry strengthens 
reasoning to the vital importance of contractor surveillance and TINA provisions in 
determining fair and reasonable prices. Adverse selection and moral hazard will aid in 
describing the problems within defense procurement, which will be discussed next.  
C. THE ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IN 
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT 
1. Unique Characteristics of Major Weapon System Acquisitions 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) are unique and complex in nature. 
Wang and San Miguel argue that, “MDAP contracting environment is unique in the sense 
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that an MDAP contract is typically a sole-buyer-and-sole-seller case, in which market 
competitive forces rarely exist and significant information asymmetry and potential 
agency problems prevail” (Wang & San Miguel, 2013, p. 6). The major contributing factor 
to the “sole source” or “near sole source” contracting scenario is “the complexity, 
uncertainty, and long-term commitment in major weapon systems” Other reasons are “the 
DOD’s need for secrecy, expediency, and/or safeguarding human resources” (p. 6).    
The “sole-source” scenario puts the DOD at an informational disadvantageous 
position relative to the contractor in the contracting process. Due to the significant 
information gap between the contractor and the government, the contractor has intent and 
ability to extract information rents from the government. Information rent means, the 
agent (contractor) has more information than the principal (government) and is not 
providing that information to the principal, in terms of information and effort. Moreover, 
since the effort level of the only capable contractor is not observable, contractors’ 
shirking becomes a legitimate concern. Agency Theory is related to information rents, as 
there is a higher risk in developing MDAP with higher levels of uncertainty. (Rendon, 
2011) 
In reality, DOD has a policy for monitoring and surveying the contractor. There 
are policies set up for individuals to monitor performance such as Quality Assurance 
Evaluators (QAE), Contracting Officer Representatives (COR), and the Defense 
Contracting Management Agency (DCMA). DCMA is the agency that provides contract 
administration for many high dollar contracts with performance being an item that is 
evaluated. With an entire agency being accountable for the contractor surveillance, it 
would seem that there would not be any issue in providing the appropriate materials and 
information from contractors. In addition to information rents, adverse selection and 
moral hazard, which will be expounded upon later, further explain the concepts related to 
the lack of information and effort from contractors.          
2. Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
The adverse selection (i.e., contractor has hidden information) problem arises 
when contractors have information withheld from the government. Many times, the 
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government needs assistance with determining how much a product or a new system 
should cost. Through the procurement planning phase (market research and the 
requirement management process) the government gains a better grasp on the companies 
that provide quotes and is able to negotiate better prices for the requirement.  
Laffont and Tirole (1993) provide a footnote from Robert Keller, who was the 
former assistant comptroller general of the United States in regards to adverse selection, 
stating: 
The government negotiator generally is at a disadvantage in trying to 
negotiate, since the contractor knows not only all the facts and the 
assumptions underlying his estimates, the alternatives available to him, 
and the contingent areas, but he also knows the price at which he will be 
willing to accept the contract. (p. 2) 
While Keller’s statement is correct, DOD attempts to subsume the affects of 
adverse selection by conducting market research and necessitating the customer define 
the requirement for each contract.  
While adverse selection is impactful on obtaining key information, moral hazard, 
another issue related to obfuscated details, describes the withholding of data related to 
contractor effort. Laffont and Tirole (1993) define moral hazard (i.e., contractor has a 
hidden effort) as, “endogenous variables that are not observed by the regulator. The firm 
takes discretionary actions that affect its cost or the quality of its products. The generic 
label for such discretionary actions is effort” (p. 1). Effort is hard to observe and hence 
cannot be contracted as a unit of measure. As a whole, society is lazy and hence 
contractors tend to shirk unless incentives are provided to induce more effort. With moral 
hazard, the information provided by the contractors on their past performance and quality 
of work can be manipulated to make it seem as though the company is making their best 
effort, and some very well might be, but in reality, the contractors are shirking. 
In reality, DOD has systems in place that collect contractor past performance 
information, both positive and negative, and this information is used in contract source 
selections. Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) and Past 
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Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) are both automated systems that are 
web-based that aid the government in the contracting process.  
In general, DOD contracts are subject to both adverse selection and the moral 
hazard problem, given that significant information asymmetry is the norm and the effort 
level of contractors are generally not observable, despite the government’s policy and 
requirement for contractor surveillance. Hence, a benevolent government that aims to 
maximize the whole society’s welfare has two policy objectives in mind: limiting undue 
information rents and inducing cost-saving effort. The issues outlined above are 
impactful across the contract types, yet while pervasive in nature, the extent and specific 
influence of moral hazard and adverse selection varies between fixed price, cost-
reimbursement, and incentive type contracts. These types of contracts will be discussed 
next.    
D. VARIOUS CONTRACT TYPES AND POWER INCENTIVE SCHEMES  
1. Fixed Price, Cost-Reimbursement, and Incentive Contracts  
There are two major categories of contracts: fixed-price and cost-reimbursement 
contracts. The two polar cases are firm-fixed price (FFP) and cost-plus fixed-fee 
contracts (CPFF).  
According to FAR 16.202–1: 
A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any 
adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing 
the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk 
and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. It provides 
maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform 
effectively and imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the 
contracting parties.  
 
FAR 16.306 states: 
A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that 
provides for payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at 
the inception of the contract. The fixed fee does not vary with actual cost, 
but may be adjusted as a result of changes in the work to be performed 
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under the contract. This contract type permits contracting for efforts that 
might otherwise present too great a risk to contractors, but it provides the 
contractor only a minimum incentive to control costs. 
Contract type must be determined by associated risk, requirement complexity, and 
solutions available within the marketplace. On the contract type spectrum, the extreme 
left where broad requirements accompany a high level of government risk, is purely cost-
reimbursement contracts. Firmly defined requirements where the contractor assumes the 
highest level of risk is on the right of the spectrum, which include fixed price contracts. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between contract type, requirement, and risk 
 
Figure 2.  Relationship between Contract Type, Requirement, and Risk 
(from Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
As shown above, more risk for the buyer (government) results from the use of 
cost-reimbursement type contracts. DOD uses cost-reimbursement contracts for 
requirements such as prototypes due to the less defined requirement. For fixed-price type 
contracts, the government has low risk because the requirement has already been defined 
and DOD knows what to expect from contractors with a full understanding of the supply 
or service being purchased.  
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An FFP contract addresses the moral hazard problem but still suffers from adverse 
selection. In this type of contract, the contractor is motivated to exert the best effort to 
save on cost and maximize profit. Adverse selection on the other hand is still a major 
problem due to contractors’ strong incentive to withhold their proprietary information as 
well as extract information rents. Even with market research completed by contracting 
officers, the adverse selection problem remains a significant issue.         
A CPFF contract, in contrast, addresses the adverse selection problem better 
because the reimbursement is based on incurred rather than estimated cost. However, 
moral hazard becomes the main worry since contractors have no incentive to curb costs. 
The lack of incentive to minimize cost is due to the fact that contractor’s fee is fixed and 
any cost saving will be passed on to the government as opposed to the contractor. All cost 
incentives by the contractor will be reimbursed, assuming that they are allowable, 
allocable, and reasonable.    
TINA provisions bear high importance through defense acquisition phases, as it 
allows the government to obtain certified cost or pricing data which may not have been 
available had commercial purchases or competed purchases been made. It is important 
for the government to have not only their own reliable cost estimates, but to also have a 
basis for evaluating contractors’ proposed estimates as well. Additionally, risk of cost 
overruns is reduced if cost reimbursement and fixed price contracts are used for 
suggested requirements on the contract vehicle spectrum outlined in Figure 2. 
In addition to the FFP and CPFF, there are various incentive contracts that lie 
between the two extreme cases. They are: Fixed-Price-Incentive (FPI) Contracts, Cost-
Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) Contracts, and Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) Contracts. These 
incentive contracts are intermediate contracting arrangements between the two polar 
types and they typically address both adverse selection and moral hazard, yet neither is 
effective enough. With each contract type, there is an amount of motivation that 
empowers contractors to perform. The empowerment for motivation is based on an 
incentive scheme, which is discussed next.                 
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2. Power of Incentive Schemes 
The various types of contracts discussed possess different power of incentive 
schemes. Power, in relation to incentive schemes, means the extent to which the scheme 
can motivate effort. Table 1 is reproduced from Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
 
 Transfer Allowed? 
Power Yes 
(procurement, most public 
enterprises) 
No 
(most private regulated 
firms) 
Very High 
(firm residual claimant) 
Fixed price contracts Price caps 
Intermediate 
(cost or profit sharing) 
Incentive contracts Incentive regulation 
Very Low 
(government or consumers 
residual claimants) 
Cost-plus contracts Cost-of-service regulation 
Table 1.   Power of commonly used incentive schemes  
(from Laffont & Tirole, 1993, p. 11) 
 
Laffont and Tirole explain that a cost-reimbursement contract has the government 
pay the contractor its allowable cost plus a fee while a fixed-price contract has a set limit 
that the government will pay regardless of what the actual cost incurred. They also 
explain that the incentive contracts have the government and the contractors share the 
actual costs.  
With a fixed-price contract, contractors are incentivized to put forth the most 
amount of effort. Although the contractor knows they will receive a fixed price for their 
product, the more they reduce the cost, the more profit they will realize. Thus, fixed price 
contracts are high power incentive schemes. 
A cost-reimbursement contract gives few incentives to the contractor to exert 
effort and hence is labeled as low power incentive scheme. Incentive contracts, as 
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intermediate arrangements between fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts, are 
intermediate power incentive schemes. The literature shows that if a contract is fixed-
price, the effort is induced 100%. If the contract is cost-reimbursement, the effort is 
induced at 0%. (Laffont & Tirole, 1993, p. 40)  The next section will discuss non-
commitment and the ratchet effect.  
E. NON-COMMITMENT AND THE RATCHET EFFECT 
In DOD contracting, contracts are traditionally awarded for one basic year with 
priced options for additional years. This is known as multiple year contracting. Another 
approach is multi-year contracting. Multi-year contracting is described as “a single 
contract for two to five years’ worth of procurement of a given kind of item without 
having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first” (O’Rourke & Schwartz, 
2014, p. 3). To gain a better understanding, Table 2 summarizes the O’Rourke and 
Schwartz example of the difference between multiple-year contracting and multiyear 
contracting aircraft.  
 
Number of Contracts FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019
Multi‐year Procurement 1 1 0 0 0 0
Fund Request 1‐Time Authorization X
Contract Execution Approved in FY2015 X
Aircraft Purchased on Contract One‐time 20 0 0 0 0
Congressional Approval? Yes
Number of Contracts FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019
Multiple‐year Procurement 5 1 1 1 1 1
Fund Request Annual Authorization X X X X X
Contract Execution Approved Each FY X X X X X
Aircraft Purchased on Contract Annual 4 4 4 4 4
Congressional Approval? No  
Table 2.   Multi-year vs. Multiple Year (after O’Rourke & Schwartz, 2014, p. 3) 
Typically, the contractor would view long-term contracts as a positive incentive 
for profit. Under multi-year procurement (MYP), if the government cancels a program 
and subsequently terminates the contract, the government owes the contractor a fee. For 
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the government, adhering to 10 U.S.C. 2306b(a) criteria is critical to staying on cost. 
Criteria includes 1) substantial savings, 2) realistic cost estimates, 3) a stable need for the 
items, and 4) a stable design (O’Rourke & Schwartz, 2014, pp. 5–6). An alternative to 
MYP is multiple-year contracting. The issue with the ratchet effect is that with short-term 
contracts, a contractor has little incentive to improve target costs when there is a small 
window of performance. In cost-based requirements, multiple-year contracts may be used 
to provide long-term incentives to contractors while providing a reliable contract vehicle 
for recurring needs. Awarding multiple-year contracts ensure that the short-term contract 
is guaranteed and option years are written in the contract for long-term commitment. The 
risk of exercising options is still present, but at a less extent so as to incentivize the 
contractor to perform well in order to guarantee an additional year. Multiple-year 
contracts do not require congressional approval or guarantee of funds stability, and can be 
used for cost reimbursement type contracts and fixed price type contracts. However, 
contractor performance is paramount to the government exercising options under 
multiple-year contracts. If the contractor does not think the government will be 
committed throughout the life of the basic year plus options, information rents may 
occur. Laffont and Tirole (1993) relate information rents to the ratchet effect: 
If the firm performs well (produces at a low cost) early in the relationship, 
the regulator infers that the technological parameter is favorable and tries 
to extract the firm’s rents by being more demanding during the regulatory 
review. The firm has thus an incentive to keep a low profile by not 
engaging in much cost-reducing activity. To induce the firm to produce at 
a low cost when efficient, the regulator must offer it a generous reward for 
good performance. (p. 45)  
Stated equivalently, the lack of the commitment from the government naturally 
leads to contractors’ fear of being “ratcheted up” if they reveal their lowest possible cost. 
The issue with the ratchet effect is that with short-term contracts, a contractor has little 
incentive to improve target costs when there is such a small window of performance. 
Being efficient one time would eliminate their future rents. Therefore, unless the profit 
from one-year contract is sufficiently sizable, contractors would choose not to engage in 
cost-saving activities as much as they can. The cure to the problem above is 
straightforward. Laffont and Tirole (1993) state: 
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To put the ratchet effect in perspective, recall that, if the two parties  
can commit to a long-term contract at the beginning of their relationship, 
the regulator optimally commits to use each period the optimal static 
contract. That is, it is optimal for the regulator to commit not to exploit  
the information acquired from observing the firm’s performance. 
Commitment is crucial for this outcome because the regulator would want 
to fully extract the firm’s rents from the second period on after the firm 
reveals its efficiency in the first period. (p. 376) 
 Another area that will be discussed within agency theory is cost padding.  
F. COST PADDING 
Cost padding, if not detected and controlled by the government, adds unnecessary 
cost to the government. Examples of cost padding include but are not limited to: 
incurring excessive costs to the government such as leisurely meetings, first class travel, 
and business lunches. Other examples are shifting overhead costs from commercial 
business to government contracts and engaging in various bookkeeping tricks to 
manipulate costs. The government counters contractor cost padding by requiring certain 
contractors to be audited. Both Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) provide oversight and audit of contractor 
operations and cost.  
The DCMA has a systemic operational cycle that allows monitoring contractor 
cost driving contractor performance. In the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM), 
Chapter 9 discusses Audit of Cost Estimates and Cost Proposals. Cost padding is a factor 
in labor cost data. It states:  
The auditor should examine, on a selective basis and in cooperation with 
Government technicians...for the new product. When appropriate, 
contractor personnel should be interviewed to ascertain probable 
significant changes in engineering production methods and the effect those 
changes might have on current cost data. When an evaluation indicates 
that significant technological changes have occurred since the cost data 
was accumulated, adjustment of experienced costs is necessary before 
projecting the experience cost pattern. 
The manual further explains the contractors’ variances of direct labor cost and illustrates 
a “guesstimate” is made and then a “padding” is added to protect from any unexplained 
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cost. Through the book keeping manipulations, resulting “guesstimates” and subsequent 
“padding,” the contractor audit becomes a significant challenge to accurately appraise the 
extraneous cost. Cost padding is viewed as being more prevalent in cost-reimbursement 
contracts, though as will be elaborated later, the incentives for cost padding still exist 
under a fixed-price contract. 
G. SUMMARY 
The academic literature covered the agency theory, the contract management 
process, unique characteristics of DOD major weapon system acquisitions, and the 
impact of adverse selection and moral hazard concepts on DOD contracting. Power 
schemes for incentives within various contract types, non-commitment along with the 
ratchet effect, and cost padding were also discussed. This chapter discussed agency 
theory issues and also DOD polices that mitigate those issues. The contract management 
process described contracting activities within DOD aligned to counter agency theory 
concepts. Adverse selection and moral hazard showed the hidden information and effort 
that theoretically is produced while the power incentive scheme showed they types of 
contracts and how they combat those issues. Non-commitment and the ratchet effect 
identified the differences between multi-year contracting and multiple year contracting 
and provided examples of each contract. Finally, cost padding showed the behavior of 










IV. TINA: WHAT IT DOES WELL 
A. TINA DETERS FRAUD AND DEFECTIVE PRICING  
The Truth in Negotiations Act, which is now referred to as 10 USC 2306a, Cost 
or Pricing Data: Truth in Negotiations (DCAA Representative, personal communication, 
04 December 2014) does many things well. The main purpose of the Truth in 
Negotiations Act is to protect the Government from the contractor submitting inflated 
cost and pricing data and therefore receiving unwarranted profit. It allows for the 
contracting officer to receive pricing information on non-commercial items, for which the 
contracting officer has very limited basis to determine a fair and reasonable price. TINA 
is a statute put into place to ensure that the contracting officer has necessary information 
to perform their stewardship role for safeguarding taxpayers’ money. By imposing 
potential financial loss, reputational damage, and sometimes even litigation risk to the 
contractor, TINA effectively creates a disincentive for the government contractors to 
engage in fraud and defective pricing practice.  
The success of TINA can be partially demonstrated by data from the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). The DCAA is an agency under the Department of 
Defense that aids acquisition personnel with contract auditing, cost and price evaluation, 
and contract administration. The DCAA describes its mission as “… provides audit and 
financial advisory services to Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal entities 
responsible for acquisition and contract administration. DCAA operates under the 
authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief 
Financial Officer” (DCAA, n.d.). Additionally, the DCAA performs post award audit for 
contracts under TINA and oversees defective pricing cases for the Department of 
Defense.  
Between 2008 and 2014, the DCAA documented that there were 114 audits that 
had been issued that reported an instance of defective pricing (DCAA Representative, 
personal communication, August 28, 2014). Out of the 114 audits that had been issued, 
39 defective pricing cases had been resolved (during the time of the requested data). 
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(DCAA Representative, personal communication, August 28, 2014)  Of these 39 resolved 
defective pricing cases, the government was able to recoup funds from 32 of these cases. 
(DCAA Representative, personal communication, August 28, 2014).   
This means that merely 18% of defective pricing cases are ruled in the 
contractor’s favor. Additionally, 37 out of the 38 contracts on the report were firm fixed 
price-type contracts and one was a cost plus fixed fee contract (a cost reimbursement type 
contract) (DCAA Representative, personal communication, August 28, 2014). This is not 
a surprise because defective pricing is a major concern in the context of fixed-price 
contracts as opposed to cost-reimbursement contracts.  
Figure 3 illustrates the government savings from the price adjustments made for 
these 39 defective pricing contracts during 2008–2014. The charts represented in the 
figures below illustrate not the year of the contract award, but rather the government 
fiscal year that a settlement was reached. For instance, a 2008 contract may have been 
audited but did not reach a settlement until 2009. Therefore, this 2008 contract would be 
represented in 2009 data in the figures below. According to the chart, the government 
was able to recoup a total amount of $65,242,000.  
The Net Savings to Government is the total net amount of savings 
(including recovered interest—but not penalties—on overpayments) that 
the Government achieves from the defective pricing audit. For FFP 
contracts, savings will consist of the Negotiated Total Price Adjustment 
less Negotiated Offset Amount plus applicable profit. For CPAF/CPFF 
contracts, the savings will consist of the fee/profit reduction. For CPIF/FPI 
contracts, the savings will consist of the fee/profit reduction plus the 
contractor share of the cost reduction. (DCAA, 2014) 
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Figure 3.  Total Government Savings (2008–2014) (from DCAA, 2014) 
Figures 4–9 display data by individual government fiscal year of the settlement 
(dollar amounts are represented in $000). 
Figure 4 shows that there were three FFP contracts with defective pricing that 
were settled in 2009, for all of which the contractors fully accepted the price adjustments 
recommended by the DCAA. This resulted in $1,115,000 direct savings to the 
Government and provides evidence for the effectiveness of TINA. 
 
    2009        2010        2011    2012        2013       2014
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 984  
 14  
 57  
 984  
 14  
 57  
 121,531  




1 2 3 
Assigned Contract Value 121,531  ‐  ‐  
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 984  14  57  
Nego ated Amount 984  14  57  
2009 
Assigned Contract Value 
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 
Nego ated Amount 
 
   
Figure 4.  2009 Resolutions/Settlements (from DCAA, 2014) 
The remaining Figures 5–9 display information pertaining to years 2010 through 
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 329,931  
 14,642  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Assigned Contract Value 329,931  14,642  16,717  12,604  66,278  12,386  ‐  ‐  ‐  
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 416  248  1,431  963  7,059  363  81  602  2  
Nego ated Amount 361  ‐  1,431  963  7,059  363  62  41  2  
2010 
Assigned Contract Value 
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 
Nego ated Amount 
 











 3,178  
 1,241  
 21,595  
 1,136  
 4,691  
 976  
 341  
 105  
 1,037  
 3,178  
 1,241  
 22,596  
 1,218  
 4,691  
 976  
 341  
 105  
 52,616  
 39,058  
 16,846  
 32,253  
 80,931  
 17,106  
 3,404  










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Assigned Contract Value 52,616  39,058  16,846  ‐  ‐  32,253  80,931  17,106  3,404  
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 1,037  3,178  1,241  22,596  1,218  4,691  976  341  105  
Nego ated Amount ‐  3,178  1,241  21,595  1,136  4,691  976  341  105  
Year 2011 
Assigned Contract Value 
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 
Nego ated Amount 
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1 2 3 4 
Nego ated Amount 4,822  683  ‐  ‐  
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 4,822  683  121  256  
Assigned Contract Value 532,000  421,497  47,017  23,115  
2012 
Nego ated Amount 
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 
Assigned Contract Value 
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 211  
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1 2 3 4 
Assigned Contract Value 34,893  436,108  5,425  ‐  
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 9,544  954  211  795  
Nego ated Amount 2,073  954  ‐  766  
2013 
Assigned Contract Value 
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 
Nego ated Amount 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Assigned Contract Value 196,710  19,085  1,207,665  ‐  14,474  207,288  41,384  1,040  ‐  8,473  
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 177  106  2,645  477  490  608  813  763  434  474  
Nego ated Amount 177  ‐  ‐  224  490  50  813  763  434  474  
2014 
Assigned Contract Value 
DCAA Rec. Price Adjustment 
Nego ated Amount 
 
Figure 9.  2014 Resolutions/Settlements (from DCAA, 2014) 
To summarize, the evidence above demonstrates the value of TINA. With the use 
of TINA, the DOD is provided a blanket of protection in the form of an audit, which 
allows the DOD to recoup any over-inflated negotiated prices due to contractors 
submitting defective certified cost and pricing data. Along with the provided information 
included above, DCAA also includes the following statement “Not shown, is the set of 
positive Defective Pricing (DP) reported assignments issued since 10–01–2008 that have 
not yet been resolved/settled. That is 75 assignments with a grand total of approximately 
$290M in recommended price adjustments attributed to defective pricing” (DCAA 
Representative, personal communication, August 28, 2014). 
It is also worth noting that the benefits shown above are only part of the TINA 
success. It is reasonable to conjecture that TINA effectively deters many federal 
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contractors from engaging in procurement fraud or defective pricing, which they could 
have done had TINA not been in place. 
B. TINA REDUCES INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND LIMITS 
INFORMATION RENTS 
As elaborated in the literature review, DOD acquisition contracting is subject to 
both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Consequently, policy makers have 
two objectives: mitigating adverse selection by limiting information rents that arise from 
information asymmetry (hidden information) and inducing the cost-saving effort to 
mitigate the moral hazard problem (hidden effort). 
We believe that TINA does a reasonably good job in tackling the adverse 
selection problem and indeed reduces information rents from otherwise much more 
informed contractors. TINA accomplishes this goal because it allows contracting officers 
to negotiate fair and reasonable prices associated with the procurement by having 
contractors certify their costs and pricing data when the contracting officer has no other 
means for negotiating fair and reasonable prices. TINA reduces information rents that 
would otherwise have occurred due to contractors having inside price information that 
isn’t available for the contracting officer. It also holds the contractor accountable to their 
prices with the use of audits to ensure inflated pricing have not occurred at the 
completion of the procurement. However, we want to caution policy makers that this 
does not mean TINA fully removes information asymmetry, and completely eliminates 
information rents. Rather, by requiring contractors to submit “cost or pricing data” that 
are “current, complete, and accurate,” TINA alleviates the rent seeking behavior in a 
meaningful way, especially on the part of the information that is ex-post verifiable. So 
what exactly is information rents?  
…having private information gives the player possessing it a potential 
strategic advantage in his dealings with the other player For example, 
consider a seller who has better information about his costs than his buyer. 
By behaving as if he had high costs, the seller can seek to induce the buyer 
to pay him more than she would if she knew he had low costs. That is, he 
has an incentive to use his superior knowledge to capture an “information 
rent. (Caillaud & Hermalin, 2000, p. 1)  
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What TINA does to reduce information rents is to mandate that contractors 
provide certified cost and pricing data and legally hold them accountable in order to 
ensure that contractors are submitting legitimate cost and pricing data. With the potential 
use of auditing, DCAA ensures that contractors submit accurate and complete contracting 
data to avoid being audited and having the potential of the government recouping funds 
from the contractor.  
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter focuses on what TINA does well. We first use the DCAA data to 
illustrate the effectiveness of TINA in deterring fraud and defective pricing. Further, we 
point out that TINA reduces information rents by requiring contractors to submit “cost or 
pricing” data that is “current, complete, and accurate.” The next chapter will discuss what 





































V. WHERE TINA DROPS THE BALL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As pointed out in Chapter III, defense procurement is subject to both adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, consequently, limiting information rents and 
incentivizing contractors’ cost-saving effort become two main policy objectives for the 
government. 
Chapter IV argued that TINA, to some extent, mitigates the adverse selection 
problem by mandating that contractors provide certified cost and pricing data that are 
“current, complete, and accurate” and legally holding the contractor accountable. Hence, 
it is fair to say that TINA helps policy makers achieve one of their two policy goals: 
limiting information rents. On the contract vehicle spectrum, properly using cost 
reimbursement and fixed price contracts when appropriate (see Figure 2) will help reduce 
risks of moral hazard and adverse selection. However, because TINA only requires 
contractors to provide cost or pricing info and not necessarily visibility of effort, 
contracting personnel must rely on alternative regulations and surveillance to ensure 
contractor performance. 
This chapter, however, emphasizes the ineffectiveness of TINA. In particular, 
building on an economic-based, incentive-centric approach that investigates contractors’ 
incentives, we argue that a main flaw of TINA is its failure to address the moral hazard 
problem. In cases such as cost reimbursement contracts, where moral hazard is an 
inherent concern to begin with, we argue that TINA fails to provide remedies for existing 
conditions. In other cases such as fixed-price contracts, where moral hazard is otherwise 
appropriately addressed, we argue the use of TINA undesirably removes contactors’ 
incentive to exert effort. Therefore, TINA, in the context of fixed-price contracts, is the 
problem rather than the solution. 
B. CONTRACT PRICING 
In contract pricing, proposal cost estimation is based on contractors’ minimum 
cost to deliver quality goods and services which factor in profit and risk (Figure 10). It 
  38
can be assumed that cost is variable based on numerous offerors’ proposing prices and 
competition within the industry. The target contract price is determined by how the 
offeror estimates target high and low cost. 
 
Figure 10.  Contract Pricing 
Depending on where Ca (actual cost) is on the horizontal plane, a contractor will 
be operating at a profit within cost-high and cost-low parameters. Cost or pricing data 
gathered by the contractor during contract performance will then determine the accuracy 
of their estimates in comparison to actual costs, Ca. In contracts without TINA 
governance, a contractor would want Ca ≥ Cl because any cost savings to the right of Cl  
(their minimum estimate that, if equal to contract price, they will receive no profit 
without cost savings) will translate into pure profit (μ) without penalty. Simply stated, μ 
= Ca - Cl and the larger the gap between the two values, the greater the profit will be. 
However, the government would not know that the contractor was able to save 
money and how large the profit-cost gap was because certified cost or pricing data would 
not have been required. In the case of obtaining the lowest price, the government may 
suffer from information rents that reach beyond the current procurement; information 
rents also adversely affect future contracts if previous contract prices are used as a basis 
for price fair and reasonableness in limited competition. Under cost reimbursement type 
contracts, the contractor is reimbursed for costs and are not incentivized to reduce costs 
or even to control any high or excessive expenditures. Because of situations like these, 
TINA is not only needed to reduce moral hazard but also adverse selection. 
However, in contracts governed by TINA provisions, cost estimation is more 
complex. Proposed contract price may be variable based not only on minimum costs to 
deliver quality goods and services, but also with the risk of defective pricing when costs 
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must be certified. Once offerors submit cost or pricing data and it is certified, the contract 
is then executed and the certified cost/price becomes the baseline. Any deviation of data 
results in a red flag for defective pricing and thus moral hazards play a part in 
determining contract price. In other words, TINA penalizes contractors to reduce costs 
that make the negotiated cost or price significantly different than actual cost or price 
when implemented. Figure 11 illustrates the relationships between negotiated cost, actual 











Figure 11.  Risk of Defective Pricing Case Based on Changes in Costs 
As the gap expands between Ca and Cn, the risk that the negotiated price was 
based on defective cost or pricing data increases. As shown by Figure 11, this gap can be 
caused by both actual costs increasing or decreasing from negotiated cost estimates. 
Although some unexpected cost deviations may result from unforeseen events or actions 
inherent with estimating long term fixed price contracts, there is a risk that cost 
deviations were the result of the contractor submitting cost estimates that were not 
current, accurate, and complete. A small deviation from negotiated prices may not set a 
red flag for defective pricing, but over time, a contractor is more susceptible to accrued 
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changes. Additionally, as time goes by between negotiated contract costs (Cn) at the time 
of award and actual final costs at the conclusion of the contract, the contractor’s risk of 
defective pricing increases if foreseen changes occur, and those changes were not 
properly disclosed. Upon submission of the proposal and until costs are negotiated, 
offerors are responsible for ensuring the cost or pricing data is current, accurate, and 
complete. Often, if defective pricing occurs, it will occur before a pricing agreement is 
reached and prior to contract start-date (DCAA Representative, personal communication, 
Dec 3, 2014). Additionally, throughout the phases of the contracting process and the 
longer the contract period of performance is, the more evidence is available to auditing 
personnel as to whether negotiated prices stated were based on defective cost or pricing 
data. If there is evidence showing significant cost underruns, there is a risk that some 
portion of the underrun is attributed to a higher negotiated price due to defective cost or 
pricing data (2014). Consequently, programs that experience cost overruns in the 
acquisition life cycle may be because of poor cost estimates and had better estimation 
occurred then actual reported costs might have not deviated as significantly from 
negotiated costs. 
Cost deviations (overruns or underruns) however, are merely one indicator that 
auditors use to determine whether contractors have complied with TINA regulations prior 
to a pricing arrangement being made. As previously stated, prior to price negotiation, 
defective pricing can occur prior to the contract start-date. Many times, the information 
that could provide evidence of defective data can be provided by the offeror prior to 
negotiated costs. Such information includes undisclosed subcontracting cost or price 
negotiations, communications between contracting and subcontracting offerors indicating 
lower prices, and undisclosed historical labor hours or material costs (2014). Risk factors 
for defective pricing may also be non cost-based. Examples included below (DCAA 
Representative, personal communication, December 4, 2014): 
1. Post Negotiation Memorandum: estimates may have been based on 
abstract estimates or costs, such as from engineering estimates, despite the 
undisclosed existence of historical costs. 
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2. Auditing Timeframe: Auditing work takes a lot of time and could have 
delays. If no updated cost or pricing data is submitted during the time of 
auditing (e.g., new quotes on labor or materials, etc.) it could be due to the 
fact that the contractor’s system designed to disclose updates is 
malfunctioning. 
3. Changes to Processes: Any changes to processing (i.e., manufacturing 
or materials) may affect the cost or pricing structure of a final product. It 
could be positive and result in less lead-time or lower costs. If process 
changes occur soon after contract award, there is a possibility that the 
contractor had implementation plans prior to reaching price agreement, but 
failed to disclose such plans.   
Any changes in cost or pricing data should be reported or the contractor may find 
that upon audit, penalties may be owed if it is found that 1) the negotiated baseline should 
have been adjusted, or 2) the contractor knew or should have known that they willingly 
withheld information. Cost handling based on profit can be shown in Table 2 of the next 
section. 
C. DISTORTED INCENTIVES: USE OF TINA WITH FIRM FIXED PRICE 
(FFP) CONTRACTS 
In this subsection, we express our greatest concern over TINA. That is, 
unintended disincentives are created if TINA is used with a FFP contract. In the 
following, we use a step-by-step approach to illustrate the problem. 
Since 2009, support for firm fixed price contracts has been steadily increasing in 
order to limit government risk, reduce cost overruns, and improve contract effectiveness 
(Wang & San Miguel, 2013, pp. 1–2). As such, there has also been a strong policy push 
towards regulation in support of fixed price contracts to be a fix-all to the cost overruns 
DOD faced in prior years. Top leaders, including President Obama, Robert Gates, former 
Secretary of DOD, and Ashton Carter, former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, all expressed their favor toward more use of FFP 
contracts in DOD acquisition. The presidential memorandum issued to Chief 
Acquisitions Officers in March 2009 (Obama) explicitly stated that ‘‘there shall be a 
preference for fixed-price type contracts’’(p. 1). This news came after an investigation by 
GAO in 2008 that stated 70 percent of DOD’s major acquisitions programs had increases 
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in costs that totaled at least $295B in overruns. Consequently, more and more DOD 
contracts prescribe FFP. Although initiatives for proper firm fixed pricing when 
appropriate on the contract vehicle spectrum were enacted and 10 programs were 
cancelled and defunded, by 2012 at least $260B of funding needed for the continuation of 
the remaining major defense programs were a result of cost overruns (Government 
Accountability Office, 2013, p. 6). We argue that perhaps changing the contract vehicle 
with TINA governance is not the best solution to cost overrun prevention.  
As previously discussed, TINA changes the way contractors report cost or pricing 
data as well as how contractors behave. It is noted that a main reason for the push to FFP 
contracts is because they provide the least amount of risk to the government in terms of 
cost overruns. Table 3 demonstrates how cost changes can affect actions taken by the 
government and the contractor: 
 
Table 3.   Effects of Cost Deviation on Contracts Governed by TINA 
Given the more frequent use of FFP in the DOD procurement, it has become 
increasingly more important to understand how contractors’ incentives change with 
respect to the enforcement of TINA within FFP contracts. In particular, we will use a 
“without and with” approach to demonstrate the unintended negative consequences of 
utilizing TINA with FFP contracts. 
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1. FFP contracts without TINA, despite many weaknesses, are free of 
Moral Hazard problem. 
Wang and San Miguel (2013) challenge the wisdom behind policy-makers’ favor 
toward FFP contracts. In particular, they state: “the notion that fixed price contracts are 
better than cost-plus contracts for limiting cost overruns is misleading” (p. 1). The article 
further explains that FFP contracts may in fact have three negative consequences: (1) 
Fixed-Price Contracts Provide Few Risk-Sharing Benefits; (2) Fixed-Price Contracts 
Lead to Higher Government Payments; (3) Unjustified Favor toward Fixed-Price 
Contracts Promotes Inefficient Industry Structure. 
Nevertheless, despite the problems pointed out by Wang and San Miguel (2013), 
FFP contracts do have one appeal: that is, a FFP contract is a high power incentive 
scheme that effectively motivates contractors’ maximum efforts. Once a FFP contract is 
awarded, the contractor relentlessly seeks to reduce cost because every dollar saved on 
cost will directly translate into profit. Stated equivalently, contractors under FFP 
contracts without TINA voluntarily abstain themselves from shirking, i.e., moral hazard 
is not a problem at all (p. 4).  
2. FFP contracts, with TINA, lose the last benefit of being a high power 
incentive scheme. 
It is important to understand what incentives or disincentives are created or 
removed if TINA is combined with a FFP contract. One astute observation by Rogerson 
(1994) is “TINA cannot force defense contractors to reveal the lowest possible cost that 
they could produce at if they exerted an optimal effort. Rather, it essentially tells them 
that the price they negotiate must be close to the cost they actually incur.” As previously 
discussed and illustrated in Table 3, the government does have policies in place to ensure 
contractor oversight and surveillance. If policies are utilized properly along with 
thorough market research, qualified acquisition teams, and quality assurance plans, 
acquisition personnel can successfully help reduce the gap between negotiated and actual 
costs. However, contractor surveillance and oversight only occurs after contract award; 
TINA is the governing body for ensuring offerors’ cost or pricing data is certified prior to 
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acceptance of offers and it strengthens oversight by disallowing deviation throughout 
contract execution. 
As a result, a contractor under FFP contract that is subject to TINA, has the 
following ill incentive: The fear of being held accountable for any significant unfavorable 
cost discrepancy (i.e., the actual incurred cost is significantly below the ex-ante cost 
estimate negotiated with DOD as the basis for contract fixed-price) would strongly 
motivate the contractor to shirk (i.e., reduce cost-saving effort) or even engage in cost 
padding (for example, by opportunistically incurring or allocating more costs to the 
government contracts), especially when the actual costs are lower than negotiated cost or 
price estimates.  
In the situation above, shirking becomes a dominant strategy because low levels 
of effort are a disutility to the contractor with additional risk of being penalized by TINA. 
In the case of a very favorable cost scheme (i.e., if every exogenous factor turns out to be 
good), if shirking is not sufficient to bring the cost close enough to the ex-ante cost 
estimate that was negotiated, the contractor will engage in opportunistic and hard-to-
detect cost padding to ensure the reported costs do not raise red flags.  
To recap, TINA, in the context of FFP contracts, removes the last benefit of FFP 
contracts and literally turned a high power incentive scheme to a low power one. Here, 
moral hazard problem is reintroduced by the misuse of TINA. 
3. A Numerical Example 
We use the theoretical framework in Laffont and Tirole (1993) to set up a 
numerical example to illustrate the point made in prior sections. A contractor’s cost 
function is specified as follows: 
 
where β is a state parameter (e.g., technology) and e is the effort. One can interpret that β 
is the adverse selection parameter and represents contractor’s private information, and e 
is the moral hazard parameter.  
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Without losing generality, assume the state parameter β has three possible 
outcomes: good, neutral, or bad, with equally like probability. Moreover, the contractor 
can choose either work hard (e=10) or shirk (e=1). 
Case 1) Favorable situation: (β=10), with probability 1/3. 
 
Case 2) Neutral situation: (β=20), with probability 1/3. 
 
Case 3) Poor situation: (β=30), with probability 1/3. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the contractor knows the probability distribution of 
the natural state, whereas the government does not know. We also assume that the 
contractor’s negotiation strategy is to ensure breakeven even in the bad situation and he 
or she can still shirk. So the contractor will propose $40 as the cost estimate by Equation 
(4), and the government would most likely to accept, with TINA control stating that if the 
incurred cost is more than 25% lower than $40 (i.e., below $30), then the contractor is 
subject to a TINA audit. This approach is similar to how DCAA determines defective 
pricing when auditing contracts. Let’s also assume that this is a one-time static game in 
which no further contract is possible. The contractor tries to maximize its profit. 
The sequence of the actions is as follows: the contractor proposes the bidding 
price, which is accepted by the government, who attaches TINA to the FFP contract. 
Then the natural state is revealed, the contractor chooses their level of effort, and finally 
the cost is incurred. 
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If Case 3 occurs, the contractor will choose to work hard (e=10), so the cost is $31 
by Equation (4), TINA audit is not triggered, and the contractor earned a profit of $9. 
There is no Morale Hazard problem. 
In the case of a neutral situation, if the contractor works hard (e=10), his or her 
cost would be $21 by Equation (3), which is good in the absence of TINA, yet not so 
when TINA is in place. Because any cost below $30 would trigger a TINA audit. The 
contractor, knowing this risk, would choose to shirk (e=1) so the cost will be $30 by 
Equation (3), which successfully hides the contractor under the radar of TINA. Now 
TINA creates moral hazard problem. 
What if the most favorable natural state emerges? In that case, if the contractor 
works hard, he or she will incur a cost of $11 by Equation (2), which is going to raise a 
big red flag to the government. Therefore, the contractor is going to shirk, however, 
because the natural state turns out to be so favorable, even shirking is not enough to mute 
the alarm of TINA. (Note that shirking in case 1 would yield a cost of $20, which is 
below the audit threshold value $30, and hence will trigger the TINA audit) So what 
would the contractor do to evade the TINA investigation? The contractor will engage in 
“cost padding” and artificially increase the reported cost to at least $30, so he or she will 
not get into trouble. Now, TINA not only created a moral hazard, but it also generated 
bad incentives for defense contractors to engage in unethical and opportunistic “cost 
padding.”  
D. FIXING INCENTIVES: FROM STATIC TO DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE 
1. One-Shot Static Game 
A good starting point is a static situation where no further contract is possible. 
Referring to the numerical example from Section A of this chapter, the government 
already paid $40, because the contractor can avoid TINA audit in all three possible 
scenarios by either “shirking” or “cost padding” or both, and because the government 
payment is fixed. The implication is straightforward: In order to correct the disincentives 
created by TINA in the context of FFP, policy makers need to waive TINA from FFP 
contracts, so that the FFP contract remains a high power incentive scheme. However, the 
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set back is that contractors are not required to provide any certifiable cost or pricing data 
when TINA is waived. Therefore, if the contractor does in fact save costs and reach 
higher profits, the government may no longer be informed of a cost-price differential and 
may continue to pay higher prices while contractors receive higher profits. 
2. Repeated Game with Non-Commitment 
In the one shot static game (single-year term contract), when TINA is removed 
from a FFP contract the contractor is fully motivated to exert their best effort to 
maximize profit. Since no future contract is possible, the contractor is not afraid to reveal 
private information (i.e., the minimum cost that can be achieved through the best effort) 
because there is no possibility for the government to exploit the private information 
revealed against the contractor in the future. 
However, in reality, the relationship between a typical contractor and the 
government is rarely a one-shot game. Rather, it is better characterized as a repeated 
game with a risk of non-commitment from the government. That is, the government may 
have a long-term demand for the product provided by the contractor, yet, by law, the 
government must procure from the contractor on yearly basis. Typically when multiple-
year contracts are awarded, the government is agreeing to a single-year term contract 
with the option of additional years. Nearing the end of the current fiscal year, the 
government will begin the process of exercising the next option year. This decision is a 
unilateral process that a contractor may consider as non-commitment and in return may 
be apprehensive to share true cost or pricing data for fear of not receiving an additional 
option year. Predictably, the government will exercise the option years as long as there is 
still a need for the requirement (and contractor is receiving satisfactory performance 
ratings). 
In a repeated game where contracts have one base year and option years which 
can be exercised by the government, a simple removal of TINA from a FFP contract may 
not be sufficient to induce the contractor’s best effort. The contractor is in a very 
vulnerable position in the sense that if he or she chooses to reveal private information at 
the early stage of the game, that information may be used against him or her later so no 
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future information rents is possible. As discussed in Chapter III, contractors’ fear of 
being “ratcheted up” by the government motivates them to withhold their private 
information so they can still extract information rents from the government in later 
periods. However, in a multiple-year contract, removal of defective pricing threats from 
the initial year may provide to be beneficial. 
So what is the fix of the lack of incentives? If one-year FFP contract without 
TINA is not enough to motivate the contractor, the government should consider multiple-
year FFP contracts without TINA defective pricing provisions. This is especially useful if 
the product is demanded on a continuous basis. Furthermore, if fixed price incentive 
contracts are utilized to encourage cost savings on contracts for the initial year term while 
rewarding a shared percentage of cost-savings as awards, then the contractor may by 
motivated to continue open communication and discourage information rents. The idea is: 
make the reward of revealing the best effort cost big enough, so the contractor voluntarily 
tells the government what is the lowest achievable cost. It is wise to let the contractor win 
early, win big, but only win once. The government, and hence the taxpayers, win in the 
long run and win even bigger.   
3. Multiple-Year Contracts:  Numerical Example Continued 
In this subsection, we extend the static, one-shot numerical example in Part B to a 
repeated game case. Under some reasonable assumptions, we show that government 
savings can be achieved by fixing contractors’ incentives. 
Without losing generality, assume the government needs to order this product 
every year for 15 years. If each year TINA is attached for 15 annual contracts, the 
contractor will always choose to shirk4 or “shirk and cost padding” in order to avoid the 
TINA audit as well as keep the information rents for the future. Hence, the government 
will end up paying $600. Alternatively, if TINA is removed for every annual contract, 
TINA concern is removed; however, the contractor still worries about the consequence of 
revealing the lowest possible cost under the maximum effort due to the non-commitment 
                                                 
4 Note that in contrast from the one-shot game, the contractor chooses to shirk even in the bad 
situation, due to the concern of being “ratcheted up” if the lowest possible cost is revealed. 
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nature of government contracts. One-year increased profit due to effort is meagerly too 
small to entice the contractor to give up their future information rents. Thus the 
contractor will still withhold effort and choose to shirk.  
Without losing generality, assume that a 5-year FFP contract is sufficient to 
induce the contractor to exert his or her best effort. Therefore, the government commits to 
pay $40 each year for 5 years with no TINA governance required. With this commitment, 
the contractor is fully motivated to work as hard as possible and the lowest possible cost 
is revealed to the government. The government, who observes that the true expected 
lowest possible cost, cost is $21 (i.e.,  will use that information 
to price the future 10-year contracts. Under the assumption that a 10% profit is allowable, 
the government will offer $23.1 ($21*1.1) annual FFP contract for the reaming 10 years. 
So the total government payment now becomes $40*5+$23.1*10=$431, a saving of $169 
relative to the original situation. Note that if time span is longer, say 25 years as opposed 
to 15 years, then the government savings will be even larger.  
This information sharing, however, cannot be guaranteed. If the contractor is not 
obligated to provide certified cost or pricing data, there is no means for ensuring that all 
true cost-savings are being voluntarily reported. While the contractor is motivated to 
providing the lowest possible costs to their company, the same cannot be assumed for 
providing the lowest possible price to the government. 
4. TINA Waivers: A Useful Policy Tool? 
As argued in prior chapters, TINA is effective in deterring outright fraud and 
“defective pricing,” especially on the part of the cost that is verifiable. Hence, we should 
give TINA credit for doing that part right. However, TINA is much less effective to 
address the moral hazard problem, where one key determinant of the cost, namely effort, 
is unobservable, unverifiable, and non-contractible. TINA could even become very 
destructive when it is applied to a FFP contract setting, as shown earlier in this chapter. 
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Lawmakers allow TINA waivers and a shrewd utilization of that tool is essential 
for making a better use of TINA. As specified in Chapter II, one of the justifications for 
TINA waiver is “there are demonstrated benefits to granting the waiver.” Our analysis in 
this chapter detailed the reasoning for the use of TINA waivers. Based on our analyses, 
we recommend policies options below: 
If a FFP contract is negotiated with a contractor who is unlikely to have 
continuous contracting relationship with the government for the same or similar products 
and services, then a waiver of TINA should be applied. However, as it can sometimes be 
difficult to predict the future of non-continuous relationships until after the first year of 
performance, simply utilizing a TINA waiver may not be an effective solution. Federal 
Acquisition Regulation allows for certain TINA waivers under HCA approval. 
a. Increasing the use of TINA waivers may be a plausible solution if 
reasonable expectations exist that fair and reasonable pricing is already established. For 
example, per FAR 15.403–1(c)(4) the HCA may waive the requirement for contractors 
(and lower-tiered subcontractors) to provide certified cost or pricing data if such data was 
previously submitted and is updated. Allowing for more waivers is an “easy-fix” to 
lowering defective pricing cases, but it may not be the most effective in reducing 
disincentives attached to TINA. Waiving TINA may also subject the government to 
information rents that were previously mitigated. Simply waiving policy when a need for 
it still exists is, in and of itself, an ineffective policy solution. 
b. If a FFP contract is negotiated with a contractor who is likely to continue 
to provide the same or similar product to the government for years to come, then a 
multiple-year FFP contract, without TINA provisions on defective pricing data, should be 
offered to motivate the contractor’s best effort. Note that in this setting a multiple-year 
contract is needed. 
E. TINA AND COST REIMBURSEMENT AND INCENTIVE CONTRACTS 
TINA is less damaging when it is combined with cost reimbursement contracts. In 
such contracts, moral hazard is an inherent concern to start with, TINA does not 
introduce the problem, nor does TINA solve it. Under a cost reimbursement contract, the 
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contractor shirks anyway, regardless of the presence of TINA. To the extent that total 
realized cost is auditable while the various components of total cost are not (Laffont & 
Tirole, 1993), “cost padding” would still be possible. That said, TINA does make the 
verifiable part of the cost more credible, and also provides disincentives for contractors to 
engage in outright fraud and “defective pricing” behavior. 
Incentive contracts are basically intermediate arrangements between fixed-price 
and cost reimbursement contracts. Hence, similar to FFP setting, but to a less degree, any 
cost-saving incentives under incentive contracts would be weakened by TINA because 
incentives associated with intermediary contract types are hindered. The government may 
change contract type depending on the life cycle of the acquisition program and it is 
important to know how TINA will affect contracts within each milestone of a program. 
Throughout the life cycle of the acquisition, a requirement may move along the contract 
type spectrum to take into account new discoveries and established requirements. 
Because of this, TINA should also be a living-breathing provision that takes into account 
the different contract used in major acquisition rather than an end-all to pricing 
uncertainty. Because there are certain adverse selection issue sand moral hazards that are 
unique to differing contract types, acquisition personnel will need to be aware of which 
disincentives may be occurring for each contract type at each phase of the acquisition life 
cycle. Similar to the disincentives associated with TINA provisions, cost-savings under 
shared-risk contracts will also be weakened by TINA.   
F. CONCLUSION 
The overwhelming majority of defective pricing has occurred on fixed price type 
contracts (Defense Contract Audit Agency, 2014). In fact, this overuse causes a clash 
with governmental prerogative; use of FFP is encouraged due to its limit in government 
risk, but TINA increases that risk by eliminating the contractors’ incentives to reduce 
incurred costs. Additionally, fixed price type contract vehicle use in high-risk situations 
have negative unintended consequences that reaches beyond contractor shirking and 
moral hazards and moves additional costs to the contractor that may not be incurred if 
TINA provisions were not in place.   
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It is apparent that although there are cost overages on cost reimbursement type 
contracts, contractors are still not being held responsible with TINA provisions, nor is the 
level of effort required to eliminate cost overages being properly exerted in doing so. In a 
GAO report from 2009 regarding cost reimbursement contracts, GAO officials stated that 
it is unclear whether or not cost controls are being measured properly to determine if 
spending is justly above budgeted spending. Of the selected weapons programs GAO 
reviewed from 2011 to 2013, each year the portfolio of major weapons programs 
decreased (and funds were de-obligated) while the costs for remaining programs 
exponentially increased. In 2013 alone, the cost of major weapons programs increased by 
$14.1B even though many of the programs had begun or completed transitioning from 
cost reimbursement type contracts to fixed price type contracts (Government 
Accountability Office, 2013). It would seem that the link between the push for FP 
contracts and the intended goals of TINA might be leaving too much room for 
misinterpretation and that a refinement in policy is necessary. 
The next chapter will summarize our research, present our conclusion, and 





VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND  
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
Based on a review of TINA institutional knowledge and academic literature, this 
research performed an economic analysis of TINA. The analysis focused on how the 
current use of TINA affects contractors’ incentives in various contract settings. In 
particular, while we acknowledge the effectiveness of TINA in mitigating adverse 
selection problem and limiting information rents, especially on the verifiable part of the 
cost, we conclude that TINA may not be effectively incentivizing contractor effort. 
Regarding the effectiveness of TINA, this report also analyzed how TINA limits 
contractor incentives through different contract types on the contract spectrum. The goal 
of TINA is to ensure fair and reasonable pricing when contracting for goods or services 
in various settings of price thresholds, unique items, and competition. Although TINA is 
successful in achieving this goal, its success is not without adverse side effects.  
Through numerical examples, we argued that TINA fundamentally fails to 
address the moral hazard problem in cost reimbursement and fixed price type contracts. 
In some cases, such as FFP contracts, a strict enforcement of TINA intensified the moral 
hazard problem. Contractors’ fear of being held accountable for any unfavorable cost 
variance would motivate “shirking” or engaging in “cost padding” that is suboptimal, 
leading to welfare loss and damage to tax payers. In cost reimbursement contracts, moral 
hazards are already present and should be addressed. Building on our study, we make 
corrective policy recommendations, which will be summarized in the next subsection. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this research was to provide an economic view of TINA in regards 
to what TINA does well and where TINA can be improved upon. The foundation of our 
research included three main questions that were discussed in Chapter I. 
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1. Does TINA provide the proper incentives (or disincentives) for DOD 
contractors to induce their best effort? 
The goal of TINA is achieved when contractors are required to provide certified 
cost or pricing data. Because fair and reasonable prices are achieved when certified cost 
or pricing data is verified to be current, accurate, and complete and trackable by approved 
cost accounting systems, TINA is lauded as successful. However, the incentives (or 
disincentives) created by TINA have effects on contractor effort and provided 
information. 
Depending on the contract type, TINA provides both incentives and disincentives 
for DOD contractors to induce their best effort. Firm fixed price contracts that are not 
governed by TINA are free of moral hazards because contractors will provide their best 
effort in order to reduce costs. However, when TINA provisions govern FFP contracts, 
the high-power incentive scheme that was present is now eliminated. Contractors may 
factor in TINA and risks of defective pricing and utilize cost padding thus raising the 
final price of the contract. Additionally, contractors may begin to shirk during contract 
performance and only provide that level of effort, which keeps costs within the negotiated 
range. Quality assurance personnel and Contract Officer Representatives can somewhat 
mitigate the problem, yet cannot fundamentally address the issue. 
Cost reimbursement type contracts are already subject to moral hazard because 
contractors have few incentives to control costs, with or without TINA provisions. 
However, as stated in Chapter V, TINA does provide some disincentives for the 
contractor to avoid fraud when providing certified cost or pricing data. 
2. What incentive-compatible policy implications can be generated from 
this scenario based analyses and economic research? 
Contractors should be incentivized to win in the short-run while DOD benefits in 
the long run. By allowing the contractor short-term wins, DOD enables contractor’s best 
effort and obtains otherwise unavailable cost information. Under long-term contracts not 
subject to TINA, a contractor has the greatest incentive to reveal true cost and pricing 
data throughout the life of the contract. The cure for the unintended consequences on 







Revising TINA defective pricing penalties for the first term of a contract supports 
contractors in the short-term while ensuring DOD long-term goals for fair and reasonable 
pricing. Requiring contractors to submit certified cost or pricing data but waiving the 
threat of defective pricing actions will still ensure the government ensured that fair and 
reasonable pricing is met and provide the contractor incentives to exert their best effort. 
The moral hazards associated with providing just enough effort to remain outside of the 
risk of penalty and cost padding due to that associated risk can be mitigated. Furthermore, 
information is not hidden from the government so adverse selection would not occur. 
Although one step further in this solution would be to waive TINA altogether, doing so 
would increase adverse selection – contracting officers would have a lack of information 
because contractor would no longer be subject to submitting certified cost or pricing data 
and moral hazards associated with cost reimbursement contracts would remain present.   
The TINA revision scheme above is best utilized with multiple-year contracting 
where the first term of the contract would not be subject to defective pricing penalties but 
each option year exercised would be. Contractors should not feel threatened if costs are 
significantly reduced during the first year, nor should the contractor be penalized if costs 
are justifiably increased.    
3. How should TINA Be Used in a Dynamic Setting?  
The solution above must be dynamic rather than static – contractors may be able 
to win in the short-run by revising TINA provisions while still allowing the government 
to win in the long-run with defective pricing consequences implemented at a later point in 
the contract life cycle and different levels of uncertainty. Included in first-time awards or 
new and emerging requirements, room could be made for allowing contractors without 
approved accounting systems to work more closely to ensure compliance if specified 
levels of effort are being exerted. Allowing for dynamic flexibility will also allow for 
contractors to reveal true cost or pricing data before they are certified and locked into a 
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contract. This will also allow for long-term government goals to match with long-term 
government contracts and incentivize the efforts of contractors. As a defense program 
moves through the acquisition life cycle, the contract type should also migrate from cost 
reimbursement type contracts towards incentive-based cost contracts and then fixed price 
contracts where incentives for cost savings and risk can be shared by both the contractor 
and the government. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Based on our research findings, we provide the following areas for further 
research: 
1. Do Fixed Price Contracts Present Similar Situations as Government 
Budgeting? 
As stated in this report, policies that are present for contract performance 
oversight are in place. However, the way that fixed price contracts are governed by TINA 
presents a similar situation to government budgeting in a sense that less costs in the 
current fiscal year creates penalties. Budgeting personnel use previous fiscal year dollar 
amounts as a basis for future fiscal budgeting and thus similar amounts of funds are 
requested year after year. The government is not only penalized for not spending all 
allocated amounts at the end of term, but also for fraud, waste, and abuse if purchases do 
not meet bona fide needs. This situation is similar to contracts governed with TINA 
because contractors must remain close to negotiated price or cost terms and thus 
deviating (even in the benefit of the government) from negotiated estimates raises the red 
flag for defective pricing data. A review on government budgeting process may give 
insight to the process surrounding cost processes of government contracts. 
2. Does the Utilization of Fixed Price Type Contracts Prevent Cost 
Overruns? 
When the DOD began to implement better buying power initiatives in 2010, there 
was a strong push for fixed price contracts instead of cost reimbursement contracts to 
prevent the government from paying cost overruns. However, this directive may have 
been misunderstood as utilizing fixed price contracts early in the acquisition stages of 
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major defense programs rather than transitioning later in the life cycle. In a GAO Report 
analyzing contract management with cost reimbursement contracts (2009), GAO stated,  
The FAR does not specifically require a transition plan from a cost- 
reimbursement contract to one with firmer pricing. However, the FAR 
states that in the course of an acquisition program, a series of contracts, or 
a single long-term contract, changing circumstances may make a different 
contract type appropriate in later periods than that used at the outset. 
Information important to such an effort would include…revisiting the 
government’s requirements to determine whether they can be better 
defined. (Government Accountability Office, 2009) 
Determining the success of contracts who have transitioned from cost 
reimbursement type contracts to fixed price type contracts can help determine what 
lessons learned need to be leveraged in order to mitigate poor policy practices, if any are 
present. TINA cannot be used as a crutch for contracts that do not have accurate cost or 
pricing estimates and changing contract type is not the remedy. The link between cost 
overruns and poor cost estimation should be evaluated prior to mandating the use of fixed 
price contracts in early phases of the acquisition life cycle. If the DOD is able to 
strengthen cost estimation practices, then cost reimbursement type contracts may not be 
subject to steep overruns.  
3. Do the Benefits of Requiring Approved Cost Accounting Systems 
Outweigh the Costs? 
Typically, special accounting system and IT system need to be approved for 
TINA compliance. Firms may forego the opportunities of doing business with the 
government because they worry about the extra cost of setting up a government-unique 
infrastructure and disclosure of sensitive cost or pricing information. Additionally, long 
lead times for re-auditing corrected discrepancies and risk of new discrepancies 
discovered may limit future attempts for this business to comply with auditing standards 
because of lack of capital, and thus a disinterest to bid for large dollar cost-type contracts. 
If this disinterest occurs, the government may be limiting its competitive pool and thus 
providing room for unnecessary cost and/or price inflation. Obtaining cost data regarding 
accounting systems, length of time for approval, and surveying contractors who forego 
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bidding may indicate whether or not the costs of obtaining and maintaining an approved 
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